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I. Background and main issues 
 
1. The inspiration for my doctoral dissertation came from various threads of my previous 
research concerning the nature of ethics, truth and deception, disagreement and the 
possibilities of rational dialogue. It also carries on the topics of my earlier MA theses. 
Of these, the MA thesis in Communications submitted at the Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University dealt with phenomena that tend to eclipse truth: Harry Frankfurt’s concept 
of bullshit, Daniel J. Boorstin’s image, and Jean Baudrillard’s simulacrum. The present 
dissertation underlines the importance of getting to truth, even if these phenomena 
hinder our attempts. My MA thesis in Philosophy at the same university concerned G.E. 
Moore, metaethics and moral epistemology. MacIntyre played a big role in that 
dissertation as someone who provided important criticism of Moore’s intutionism. Later 
on, I defended intuitionism in my thesis at the Central European University. However, 
intuitive beliefs (and the intuitionist approach) need to be supplemented by our learning 
about each other’s intuitions and beliefs – my present dissertation intends to highlight 
this need. Meanwhile, I am sticking to the claim typically attributed to intuitionists that 
morality cannot be derived from non-moral facts. MacIntyre seems to be somewhat 
contradictory with regard to this. However, I show that in various papers, he explains 
how the natural moral law is not dependent on positions regarding human nature, 
tradition, religion, or practices – although it is connected to them. Therefore, when I 
argue that the norms of shared rational dialogue is at least partly constitutive of moral 
precepts, this is mostly because the possibility and value of moral learning makes them 
moral norms: failing to learn about these invites the possibility of violating moral norms; 
this is where the normativity of dialogues that aim at learning about moral norms comes 
from. 
2. The theme of the present dissertation seems to be always topical, due to the factors that 
hinder dialogue and the challenges of relativism. Consider relativism first, as the 
argument against it takes a large part in my dissertation, and it is closely related to my 
earlier research. Relativism itself could be considered as a factor hindering dialogue: 
relativists can easily come to the conclusion that since all views are only valid relative 
to their own cultural frameworks, we cannot learn from the culture of others.  However, 
relativism constitutes a peril for other reasons too. Nevertheless, just because someone 
is a relativist, she is not necessarily violent, intolerant, or ‘dangerous’ in her behavior. 
Relativism and the denial of objective truths and norms becomes dangerous when 
 
someone’s general disposition is not peaceful and tolerant, but violent and intolerant. If 
someone (or someone’s culture’s) disposition is prone to be impatient, aggressive or 
even violent, then the denial of universal norms itself undermines the possibility of their 
reform. However, if we accept a version of antirelativism according to which our view 
is not unquestionably true and might miss objective reality, then that requires a critical 
stance which urges us to check if other cultures have a better grip on reality. 
3. Phenomena that hinder dialogue include, beside the ones that I have already listed 
(including clashing worldviews and theoretical frames), factors that could be called 
partly psychological, and partly political. We need shared dialogue ’in part because we 
need others to help us recognise significant truths – either because our abilities are 
limited in a given situation, or because our prejudices, biases and partialities, or even 
our self-deception might make learning some truths impossible – and it is hard to 
overcome these by ourselves alone. (These psychological factors might be approached 
theologically too, from the angle of ‘what Aquinas says about the roots of intellectual 
blindness in moral error, […] the misdirection of the intellect by the will and […] the 
corruption of the will  by the sin of pride, both that ride which is an inordinate desire to 
be superior and that pride which is an inclination to contempt God.’)1 
Moreover, I share MacIntyre’s diagnosis which says that one ‘of the most striking facts 
about modern political orders is that they lack institutionalized forums within which 
these fundamental disagreements can be systematically explored and charted let alone 
there being any attempt made to resolve them.’2 Post-truth, fake news, alternative facts, 
ideological bubbles and echo chambers have become well-known concepts that describe 
difficulties in reaching truth and in conducting meaningful social dialogue. All these 
factors show the importance of talking about the need for dialogue, including communal 
and political ones. 
4. The aim of my dissertation is at least twofold. On the one hand, I intend to offer a 
plausible account of the natural law, and on the other hand, I intend to provide a 
plausible interpretation of MacIntyre. With regard to the natural law, I aim to 
substantiate the claim that the norms of dialogue should be seen as universal moral 
prescriptions – that is, precepts of natural law. The main problems concerning this issue 
                                                 
1 MacIntyre, Alasdair 1990: Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 147. 
2 MacIntyre, Alasdair 1988: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
2.  
 
are questions regarding the basis of the need for dialogue, the nature and application of 
the norms of dialogue, and the political (ir)relevance of these norms. I consider these in 
different chapters of the dissertation. The conception in question comes from 
MacIntyre’s various writings on natural law, and I try to make it plausible through 
analyzing, (re)interpreting, amending, and sometimes correcting his claims. 
My main research question concerns the plausibility and consistency of this 
MacIntyrean conception. The thesis of the dissertation could be summarized by the 
claim that (moral and political) dialogue does successfully ground moral norms, as 
MacIntyre suggests – however, MacIntyre’s claims as to the concrete content and 
applications of these norms are more questionable than the basic conception. 
Nevertheless, even this contestation requires dialogue, therefore these points do not put 




1. MacIntyre’s arguments concerning natural law are based on the conditions of rational 
debates and the need to provide reasons for accepting or rejecting certain judgments. He 
thinks that by claiming something to be true, we also commit ourselves to give reasons 
for its truth, and to engage in debating arguments for and against it. In order to be able 
to debate these arguments successfully, we need others to engage in dialogue with us 
who can defend opposing views in an authentic and competent way. However, their 
involvement cannot be successful and truthful if we threaten them physically, therefore 
the prohibition of threatening is one of the conditions of rational debate. MacIntyre 
argues for the need for rational debate in various ways, partly by pointing out that we 
cannot give up our claim to truth. This, according to his argument introduced above, 
constitutes a necessary feature of communication. I show why we need truth, why we 
are always implicitly committed to dialogue and debate, and why the norms of dialogue 
need to be obeyed partly by examining their inescapability, that is, pointing out that 
denying these involves either an explicit or implicit contradiction. 
2. The term ‘dialogical approach’ means the grasping of a concept through the 
phenomenon of dialogue, but it could also be applied to the identification and 
clarification of a concept by engaging in dialogue about it. The dialogical approach with 
regard to the natural law means, on the one hand, that we take the norms of the natural 
law to be identical to the ones that we need to observe in a rational dialogue. On the 
 
other hand, it also refers to the related fact that natural law prescribes dialogues – and 
that the precepts of natural law itself could be uncovered, learned, and clarified by 
engaging in, and reflecting on this kind of dialogue. 
As with communication and our lives in general, the requirements of rational dialogue 
are valid for the dialogical approach itself – its description and justification. This means, 
first, that we should consider and discuss alternative conceptions as our possibilities 
allow us, second, that our results need to be presented as always open to further debate 
– not ones that put an end to enquiry, but ones that could be put to further questioning. 
I intend to satisfy these requirements by discussing pints made by MacIntyre and others 
that could be interpreted as objections to the dialogical approach to the natural law. 
Furthermore, by emphasizing that the theory I elaborate needs further examination, 
checking, and (common) reflection. 
3. I will address both apparent and substantial inconsistencies within MacIntyre’s work. I 
have attempted to construe a unified and consistent position out of the major threads in 
his thought, of thoughts that he often emphasizes, or ones that he only brings up in 
passing. This thesis develops a coherent and plausible position based upon rather than 
summative of MacIntyre’s work. Therefore, at many points the emphasis is on revision 
rather than emulation. 
Moreover, his theory concerning natural law is somewhat fragmented: he never 
discussed it systematically, only sporadically – but at certain points in his books and in 
some of his papers. 
So, I attempt to follow his footsteps, but also to seek out answers to questions that he 
has not considered. 
I try to show in my dissertation that natural law and dialogue are central to MacIntyre’s 
thought, and also try to show its general significance for everyone relying on his works, 
while correcting or interpreting his tendencies that point in other directions. Positioning 
the dialogical approach to the natural law as central to MacIntyre’s theory in a way that 
might even eclipse some other aspects of his thought entails that at some points, there 
are going to be differences between my theses and MacIntyre’s, let alone other 
interpreters of MacIntyre. At certain points, I argue that some of his arguments demand 
reconsideration in the light of others and that apparent inconsistencies are capable of 
resloution. At other points, I employ my own arguments as well as using MacIntyre’s 
points against MacIntyre himself, arguing that some actual contradiction in his work 
should be resolved in a certain way, rather than in another. 
 
 
III. New results 
 
1. The interpretation of MacIntyre that I provide is far from being widespread, but at least 
there are a few people who interpret him in a more or less similar way. So this kind of 
interpretation is at least present in the anglophone literature (even if not the more 
complete and systematic reinterpretation that I offer in my dissertation), and at least 
MacIntyre’s papers that I treat as paradigmatic here are available in English. Meanwhile, 
I do not know of interpretations of MacIntyre in Hungarian that are relevantly similar. 
(That is why my dissertation itself is in Hungarian.)  
One of the interpretations that this thesis attempts to transcend is Jason Blakely’s. He 
argues (in relation to the MacIntyre–Winch debate) that MacIntyre successfully 
countered the relativist challenge already in the 1970s with his theory concerning 
narratives and traditions. Against him, I argue that this particular MacIntyrean theory 
has not yet fully overcome relativism, and it is only the dialogical approach to natural 
law that finally resolves this problem in his oeuvre. 
About the centrality of natural law theory in MacIntyre’s thought I take the following 
passage to be decisive: ‘we have to accord to the good of truth a place that does not 
allow it to be overridden by other goods.’3 Now this ‘good of truth’ is that which makes 
it both a need and an obligation that we observe the (dialogically conceived) precepts 
of the natural law.  
2. It is interesting to see what similarities might appear between MacIntyre and other 
thinkers as we put more emphasis on his theory of natural law – we might see some 
philosophers, threads and theses as connected or perhaps separated that we have not 
perceived as such before. Connected to certain claims with which people usually do not 
connect them, or separated from ideas which are usually seem to be closely related – 
just because they traditionally do or do not belong to the claims of a given philosophical 
school. This way, MacIntyre and others might be seen in a different light, and might 
have to be reevaluated. One of the novelties of my dissertation in this regard is that I 
point out the affinities between MacIntyre and Kant in a new way. 
3. The chapter concerning the importance of truth is one that shows that MacIntyre’s theses 
require ammendment. I try to give reasons why we are all interested in finding out 
                                                 
3 MacIntyre, Alasdair 2006: „Aquinas and the Extent of Moral Disagreement”. In Ethics and Politics. Selected 
Essays Vol. 2. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 77. 
 
various truths – be it truths regarding ourselves, our preferences, our situation, or ones 
regarding big questions that function as a background to these and similar questions. I 
point out that we have to take truth to be our need, our aim, and a constitutive part of 
our happiness, as the question of what really is good for us is the basis of answers to 
other questions concerning our needs, aims, and happiness. It is always possible that our 
conception of good is erroneous – this is why we need answers that are more true and 
more justified. Following these points, I argue that there are certain questions the answer 
to which might be of immense significance – such that learning them ought to be the 
most important thing in our lives. Now, since they have this kind of significance, even 
considering them (and the question regarding their truth) should have the same kind of 
significance. Because of this, enquiring about them should have a central role in our 
lives, in a way that leads to reliable answers – which in turn involves dialogue with 
others. 
4. Peter Winch, Catherine Zuckert, and Nathan Pinkoski are the writers with whom I have 
an extended argument in my dissertation. Both Winch and MacIntyre have charged each 
other with relativism, and they both tried to come up with answers to this kind of charge. 
I argue in my dissertation that while Winch’s attempts at downplaying the relativistic 
overtones of his view have eventually failed, MacIntyre succeeded in arguing against 
relativism (even if he managed to do this way after Blakely supposes he did so). I try to 
substantiate this claim by analyzing concepts of natural law that they both use to counter 
relativism. Winch’s idea of natural law is rather barren and questionable, and he has 
eventually given it up – at least partly. Meanwhile, MacIntyre has put forward a 
defensible conception of natural law, in which precepts are determined by the rules of 
enquiry and dialogue. Moreover, Winch and MacIntyre both have tried to establish the 
normativity of truthfulness and settle the exact content of this norm. However, this norm 
does not seem to have any real prescriptive force in Winch’s account, and he fails to 
settle its content due to the exceptions he allows with regard to its violation, while 
MacIntyre’s account of truthfulness seems to be a part of the natural law as a categorical 
and universal precept, in which he integrates cases where we actually ought to tell lies. 
The criticisms of MacIntyre put forward by Zuckert and Pinkoski are concerned with 
his political thought. It seems that both of these criticisms cannot be correct at the same 
time: MacIntyre’s conception cannot be both too demanding, that is, too robust – as 
Zuckert seems to suggest, and too apolitical, that is, too insubstantial – as Pinkoski 
claims. Now which of these criticisms is appropriate – if either? I argue in my 
 
dissertation that both criticisms misfire. MacIntyre hits the right balance in his political 
advice by offering some conclusions in some questions and by intentionally staying 
silent about other questions. I try to answer the two criticisms by using the issue of 
tolerance and censorship as an example – partly because it plays an important role in 
MacIntyre’s oeuvre. I also try to show what this important role means, and – as the two 
topics are closely related – I discuss MacIntyre’s relationship to liberalism too. This 
way, I can address Pinkoski’s concerns regarding MacIntyre’s supposedly ineffective 
criticism of liberals. Moreover, this topic leads us to the question of how dialogue plays 
an essential role in MacIntyre’s political philosophy – as questions of tolerating or 
censoring various views gain their importance in MacIntyre’s work due to being 
relevant to the conditions of the dialogue that is required by the precepts of the natural 
law. 
5. The topics in which there seems to be disagreement between the theory that I provide 
based on MacIntyre’s ideas and MacIntyre’s own claims include the relationship of the 
natural law and disciplines other than ethics, the application of natural law and the virtue 
of phronesis, and the theory of human rights. As I have addressed the first topic above 
(see the 1st paragraph on the background of, and the main issues raised in the 
dissertation), below I am only going to discuss the latter two. 
The precepts of the natural law are justified in MacIntyre’s thought primarily as rules, 
however, in some of his works, he seems to be criticizing ethics that are based on rules.  
Concerning this tension, I would like to show that values, virtues, and rules are 
inseparable in his philosophy – they are interdependent. In MacIntyre’s eyes, rules are 
important too, including explicit rules – since these enable us to rethink our practices. 
Practical rationality, or phronesis, is a key virtue that helps us in applying rules. Most 
probably, it is itself not fully based on rule-following, nevertheless, it still needs rules 
that guide it, and which it can apply to various situations; while in many situations, the 
role of phronesis is minimal, as rules make clear what the right action in a given situation 
is. 
One could easily regard everything that turns out in the chapter on MacIntyre’s politics 
of natural law to be permissible or tolerable in political communities simply as a human 
right. Couldn’t we have a natural right to participate in communal dialogue, to 
autonomously form opinions – and in general, to learn? In fact, MacIntyre is a fierce 
critique of natural or human rights, so his answer to these questions is firmly negative.   
 
Now if these are not human rights, then how should we conceive them according to 
MacIntyre? And is his conception of these plausible, or should we stick to the idea of 
human rights?  I discuss this in my dissertation partly because many authors worry that 
MacIntyre, being a communitarian thinker, deflates the importance of individuals and 
their rights. Against this kind of criticism, but actually against MacIntyre himself too, I 
argue that his argument for the dialogical approach of the natural law invalidates the 
central part of his criticism of human rights. Although MacIntyre denies the 
paradigmatic accounts of human rights, his reasons to do this are not convincing, and 
are contrary to many of his insights concerning the natural law. I believe that his 
arguments for the dialogical approach to natural law, with my amendments, could be 
considered stronger than his criticism of human rights.  
As with truth, we should attribute value and dignity to individuals, and we should avoid 
regarding them as mere instruments to enhance our rationality – which in turn requires 
us to attribute them human rights. This is the only way that we can show the kind of 
respect towards each other that provides the necessary background to rational dialogue. 
6. In my dissertation, I describe truth as one of our most important goals, and dialogue as 
the primary way that leads to it. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized – as MacIntyre 
does – that other things besides objective truth can legitimately be among our aims, and 
not every second of our lives has to be spent with discursive thinking. This is because it 
could also be objectively true (and in my opinion, it is true) that besides truth, we may 
have other goals, and these in turn can at least sometimes put dialogue and the 
application of rational thinking on the sideline – since even that can enable us to seek 
truth more effectively, and to engage in dialogue with others more efficiently and 
meaningfully.  At the end of the day, even if we do not engage in these kinds of activities 
directly, and even if engaging in them is often difficult, we ought to live lives of rational 
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